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In this paper, we argue for a stronger engagement between concepts in affective and
social neuroscience on the one hand, and theories from the fields of anthropology,
economics, political science, and sociology on the other. Affective and social
neuroscience could provide an additional assessment of social theories. We argue that
some of the most influential social theories of the last four decades—rational choice
theory, behavioral economics, and post-structuralism—contain assumptions that are
inconsistent with key findings in affective and social neuroscience. We also show that
another approach from the social sciences—plural rationality theory—shows greater
compatibility with these findings. We further claim that, in their turn, social theories
can strengthen affective and social neuroscience. The former can provide more precise
formulations of the social phenomena that neuroscientific models have targeted, can help
neuroscientists who build these models become more aware of their social and cultural
biases, and can even improve the models themselves. To illustrate, we show how plural
rationality theory can be used to further specify and test the somatic marker hypothesis.
Thus, we aim to accelerate the much-needed merger of social theories with affective and
social neuroscience.
Keywords: affective and social neuroscience, social and political theory, somatic marker hypothesis, plural
rationality
Introduction
Affective and social neuroscience have rapidly advanced during the last 25 years (Baron-Cohen
et al., 2013; De˛biec et al., 2014). As a result, insights generated in these fields have begun to influence
theorizing in the social sciences (e.g., Franks, 2010; Vander Valk, 2012). Similarly, social theories
have also started to inform affective and social neuroscience (Whitehead, 2001; Domínguez D. et al.,
2010), albeit to a lesser extent. In this paper, we build on these initial efforts to link affective and
social neuroscience with social theories. We define social theories as conceptual frameworks from
anthropology, economics, political science, and sociology that specify how people interact with, and
exercise power over, each other. We argue that affective and social neuroscience and social theories
can strengthen each other—and show how this can be done.
Verweij et al. Emotion, rationality, and decision-making
Affective and social neuroscience can support the social
sciences by offering additional assessments of the assumptions
that social theories make regarding cognition, emotion, decision-
making, and social behavior. It would be problematic if such
theories rested on premises that are inconsistent with insights
that have been carefully collected in brain research. In turn,
frameworks from anthropology, economics, political science, and
sociology can help efforts to formulate and specify neuroscientific
models. Increasingly, brain researchers have become interested
in identifying neuronal networks involved in social interactions
(Pfeiffer et al., 2013), political choices (Schreiber et al., 2013),
ethical behavior (Domínguez D., 2015), and other social
phenomena. Social science approaches can be of use to these
efforts by offering reliable and empirically valid definitions of
phenomena that affective and social neuroscientists seek to
explain. How, for instance, can one hope to uncover the neuronal
correlates of social interactions without a solid grasp of the types
of social relations people tend to engage? This is the kind of
information that social theories can provide. Furthermore, these
theories can suggest parts of the neuronal networks that enable
human emotion, decision-making, and behavior. That is to say,
approaches from anthropology, economics, political science, and
sociology can sometimes serve as a source of hypotheses for the
independent variables used in neuroscientific models (Vogeley
and Roepstorff, 2009). For example, in this paper we show how
the somatic marker hypothesis proposed in affective and social
neuroscience can be specified more fully with the help of a theory
developed in anthropology and political science.
We build our case for a further integration of social theory
and brain research as follows. In the first half of the paper, we
demonstrate how affective and social neuroscience can enhance
theorizing in anthropology, economics, political science, and
sociology. We do so by focusing on four types of social theory:
rational choice analysis, behavioral economics and public policy,
post-structuralism, and plural rationality theory. We show
that the first three types of theory contain assumptions about
human cognition, emotion and decision-making that are not
fully consistent with present understandings of how the human
brain functions. We also argue that the fourth type appears more
plausible from the viewpoint of affective and social neuroscience.
In the second half of the paper, we explore how social theories can
contribute to brain research. We combine the plural rationality
(or cultural) theory pioneered by anthropologist Douglas with
the somatic marker-hypothesis developed by Damasio, so as
to form a model of the neuronal networks involved in how
humans evaluate social situations. We argue that if this model
were empirically valid, then it would not only extend the somatic
marker hypothesis, but would also solve a remaining conceptual
puzzle of Douglas’ theoretical framework. We conclude by
discussing how this model can be tested with neuroscientific
means.
How Affective and Social Neuroscience
Can Improve Social Theory
As we mentioned above, affective and social neuroscience
can provide an additional test for social theories (besides the
internal coherence of, and empirical evidence for, these theories).
We first describe various key findings from affective and
social neuroscience with direct relevance for social theorizing.
Thereafter, we introduce four general theories that currently
abound in anthropology, economics, political science, and
sociology, paying particular attention to their treatment of
emotions, rationality, and decision-making. Finally, we argue
that only one of these appears to be fully consistent with brain
research.
Key Insights from Affective and Social
Neuroscience
The closely related fields of affective and social neuroscience have
thrived in the past few decades. Despite a variety of continuing
debates and disagreements, there appears to be (near) consensus
on a number of points. Nine of these have direct relevance for
theorizing in anthropology, economics, political science, and
sociology.
A first point of agreement is that people are deeply concerned
with, and influenced by, their social relations. The human brain
enables, makes use of, and is partly shaped by a wide array of
social interactions (Turner, 2001; Cacioppo and Patrick, 2008;
Gazzaniga, 2008; Fouragnan et al., 2013; Lieberman, 2013).
This is compatible with the social brain-hypothesis, the leading
explanation of the expansion of the human brain during the
course of evolution. According to this hypothesis (Dunbar and
Shultz, 2007), among primates, the size of the neocortex (as
compared to the whole brain) correlates with many indices of
social complexity, including social group size, grooming clique
size, the frequency of coalitions, male mating strategies, the
prevalence of social play, the rate of tactical deception, and the
frequency of social learning. Hence, we are “wired to be social”
(Castiello et al., 2010).
Second, affective and social neuroscience have particularly
focused on two aspects of social relations, namely, social
dominance (Zink et al., 2008; Chiao et al., 2009b; Ray et al.,
2010; Mason et al., 2014) and social identification (Chiao et al.,
2009a; Kitayama and Park, 2010; Cikara et al., 2011; Amodio,
2014). Social dominance entails the establishment of status
differentiation among people. Social identification stands for
the formation of group boundaries, which turns a singular “I”
perspective into a plural “we” perspective, while at the same time
creating distinctions between “us” and “them.” The processing,
in the human brain, of these two elements of social interaction
influences neuronal networks involved in attention, perception,
evaluation, memory, and emotion (Cikara and Van Bavel, 2014).
Third, the neuronal networks that facilitate social interaction
and decision-making are likely to have enabled other cognitive
functions as well (Frith, 2007a). Although the primary
evolutionary driver of human inventiveness appears to have been
increasing social complexity, this creativity, once it had emerged,
could be used for many other purposes as well. In Damasio’s
words (1994), “It is plausible that a system geared to produce
markers and signposts to guide ‘personal’ and ‘social’ responses
would have been co-opted to assist with ‘other’ decision-making.
The machinery that helps you decide whom to befriend would
also help you design a house in which the basement will not
flood.”
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Fourth, emotions, and especially social emotions (such as
empathy, admiration, spite, and jealousy), are pivotal to social
decision-making (LeDoux, 1998; Panksepp, 1998). An emotion
can be defined as “the process by which the brain determines
or computes the value of a stimulus” (LeDoux, 2002). Emotions
do not necessarily determine our social choices, and can even
be deliberately reappraised (Ochsner et al., 2002), but at a
minimum they limit and bias our decisions. Neurologically
impaired patients, who display flat emotions, often find it hard
to take personally beneficial, and socially appropriate, decisions
(Damasio, 2005).
Fifth, emotions can be distinguished from feelings (or affects).
The latter are the consequence of emotions sufficiently intense to
be noted consciously (Damasio, 1999; Panksepp, 2005; LeDoux,
2008). From this follows that not every time a person has a social
emotion, it will reach his or her awareness (i.e., give rise to a
feeling). As a result, social decision-making is to a significant
degree non-deliberate (Purves, 2010).
Sixth, although social emotions can in principle be separated
from social cognition, in practice they are highly intertwined and
mutually dependent (Phelps et al., 2014; Inzlicht et al., 2015).
After a comprehensive review of current empirical evidence,
Pessoa (2013) concludes that “labels such as ‘perception,’
‘cognition,’ and ‘emotion’ are useful linguistic categories, but only
in the limited sense of providing placeholders for descriptive
purposes – they do not map onto behavior or the brain.”
Seventh, emotions and feelings have deep evolutionary roots,
and serve the organism’s survival by ensuring homeostatic
processes (Craig, 2002; Panksepp and Biven, 2012; Damasio
and Carvalho, 2013). The neuronal circuits involved in the
processing of emotions are conserved throughout mammalian
evolution, and are therefore present in humans as well as
other mammals (LeDoux, 2002). This implies that subcortical
nuclei (including the amygdala, hypothalamus, hippocampus,
and brainstem nuclei), and evolutionary older parts of the cortex
(such as the insula), have central roles in the formation of
emotions, feelings, and social decision-making (Parvizi, 2009).
Subcortical areas are more primitive than cortical regions, and
therefore vary much less between members of the same species
and even across species (Gazzaniga et al., 2002). This does not
mean that ancient parts of the brain dictate emotions, feelings,
and social decision-making. As Pessoa (2013) emphasizes, in the
course of evolution, older brain regions, such as the amygdala
and hypothalamus, have been fully embedded into new neuronal
networks, so as to generate novel functions and support richer
patterns of interaction with physical and social environments.
As a result, subcortical and cortical areas are highly integrated.
Nevertheless, in this process, each prior form of neuronal
organization has severely constrained and shaped the emergence
of new capabilities (Anderson, 2015). Hence, Edelman (2006)
maintains that we have a “thalamocortical brain,” while Damasio
(2010) writes of the “anatomical bottleneck behind the conscious
mind,” which is responsible for “the sameness that hallmarks the
repertoire of human behavior.”
Eighth, although brain researchers have proposed diverse
lists of emotions, most of them acknowledge that emotions can
be assembled into two categories: negative (or aversive) and
positive (or appetitive) ones (Damasio, 1999; Panksepp, 2010;
Kandel, 2012). The former include for example, fear, disgust,
and embarrassment, while the latter encompass trust, love,
and admiration. The reason for this dichotomy appears to be
that, in evolutionary terms, emotions have been derived from
the neuronal and bodily networks involved in withdrawal or
approach reactions (Adolphs, 2002; Gazzaniga, 2008).
Last, an important manner in which emotions promote
survival is by facilitating learning and memory (LeDoux,
2002; Immordino-Yang and Damasio, 2007). Emotions can
be understood as reflecting, and summing up, an organism’s
experiences with similar social and other situations in the past.
As a consequence, it appears likely that cultural influences on
people’s behavior and thought function, at least partially, through
their impact on social emotions and feelings (Immordino-Yang,
2013).
These nine insights generated in affective and social
neuroscience have important implications for theorizing in
anthropology, economics, political science, and sociology. As
we argue in the next section, various—but not all—social
theories make assumptions that are inconsistent with these
insights. In view of the multitudes of social theories that have
been formulated, it is not feasible to discuss all approaches.
We therefore limit ourselves to four theoretical camps that
are currently particularly influential across the social sciences:
rational choice analysis, behavioral economics and public policy,
post-structuralism, and plural rationality theory.
Rational Choice Analysis
The first versions of rational choice theory were formulated in
the 1960s and 1970s (Riker, 1962; Olson, 1965; Niskanen, 1971).
It entailed the extension of interbellum neoclassical economics
to the fields of sociology, political science, and anthropology
(Becker, 1976; Laitin, 1986; Coleman, 1990; Scharpf, 1997). By
the 1990s, rational choice theory had established itself as the
dominant approach in political science and (under the label
of expected utility theory) in economics, and had also become
influential in sociology and, to a far lesser extent, anthropology
(Hindmoor, 2006).
According to rational choice analysis, actors are highly
informed about the options available to them, can consistently
and uniquely rank all options according to their preferences
and, based on these calculations, choose the most satisfactory
option—while also taking into account the choices that other
actors are likely to arrive at. In other words, the theory assumes
that actors’ choices are the outcomes of an exhaustive cost-benefit
analysis of all the courses of action that are available to them, as
well as to other actors. Emotions play little role in this decision-
making process. In neglecting the role of emotions, rational
choice theory is out of step with present-day neuroscience—a
point that has been made by a variety of brain researchers (e.g.,
Damasio, 1994; Koenigs et al., 2007; Krajbich et al., 2009). In
addition, affective and social neuroscience are at variance with
rational choice analysis’ under-socialized depiction of humans.
In rational choice theory, an individual’s choices are only
strategically affected by those of others. In other words, people’s
preferences are not supposed to be influenced by the social
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structures in which they partake. This is inconsistent with the
highly social nature of the brain.
Still, some scholars have sought to defend rational choice
analysis with the help of neuroscience (Glimcher et al., 2005;
Padoa-Schioppa and Assad, 2008). They have done so by
analyzing how the brain computes and compares the values
of different choices before reaching a final decision. In and of
itself, this is important research as it provides further insight
into the neuronal circuits for processing decisions. However,
these scholars have also asserted that their findings underpin
expected utility theory/rational choice analysis. This may be the
case, but many social theories, including the ones discussed in
this paper, presume that actors compare the appeal of different
options before reaching a decision. Various approaches, and not
just rational choice theory, therefore appear to be compatible
with these findings.
Behavorial Economics and Public Policy
The neuroscientific critique of rational choice theory’s premises
coincided with accumulating empirical evidence from the social
sciences that its predictions were frequently inaccurate as well
(e.g., Green and Shapiro, 1994; Henrich et al., 2001). As a result,
social scientists began to reconsider the roles that emotions
play in human life. Many have done so by building on dual-
systems (or dual process) models developed in psychology.
These models distinguish between two modes of thinking and
deciding (Chaiken and Trope, 1999; Stanovich and West, 2000;
Kahneman, 2003). In the first of these twomodes, usually dubbed
System 1, thinking and deciding are fast, automatic, intuitive,
effortless, slow-learning, and emotional. By contrast, in System
2, thinking and deciding are slow, deliberate, effortful, rule-
governed, emotionally neutral, as well as relatively adaptable.
Often, it is assumed that these modes correspond to distinct
neuronal networks in the brain, one of which (System 1) is
evolutionary older than the other. According to dual-systems
models, human cognition and decision-making are routinely
processed in System 1. Although less precise, this mode allows
people to choose satisfactory courses of action more often than
not. It is occasionally overridden and corrected by System 2,
which is slower and demands more effort, but is also more
accurate. The consequence of people’s preponderant reliance
on System 1 is that although human decision-making is often
adequate for life’s purposes, it still displays systematic biases and
fallacies. These errors explain how andwhy humans fail to display
the behavior predicted by rational choice analysis and sometimes
embark on courses of action that go against their own interests.
Beyond psychology, dual-systems models have been used
in other disciplines to develop such approaches as behavioral
economics (Thaler, 1993; Smith, 2005), behavioral law (Sunstein,
2000), and behavioral public policy (Oliver, 2013). These
approaches employ the biases and fallacies highlighted by dual-
systems models to explain a set of seemingly irrational behaviors
in finance, consumption, voting, law abidance, etc. Behavioral
theories have become quite influential in and beyond academia
during the last two decades. Chairs, graduate programs, academic
societies, annual conferences, and handbooks have sprung up,
thus institutionalizing these approaches. In recent years, the US
and UK governments, as well as the European Commission,
have used behavioral insight teams to inform future policy-
making (Oullier, 2013). Last, behavioral economics has had a
significant influence on the development of neuroeconomics
(Camerer et al., 2004). Not all neuroeconomists are behavioral
economists, but most of them are (Ross, 2008). Much effort in
neuroeconomics has therefore gone into attempts to uncover the
distinct neuronal networks subserving the emotional/intuitive
and cognitive/deliberative modes of decision-making (e.g.,
McClure et al., 2007; Albrecht et al., 2010).
Even though behavioral approaches have risen to prominence
in the social sciences, the main premise on which they are built—
namely, that emotion and cognition can be treated as separate—
is incongruent with neuroscientific evidence showing that these
two functions are largely integrated in the brain and are mutually
enabling. It is therefore not surprising that attempts to pinpoint
the neuronal substrates of Systems 1 and 2 have had contradictory
results. Specific brain regions have been associated with intuitive
judgments in one study and with deliberate judgments in another
(Volz and von Cramon, 2008). Neuroscientific criticisms of
the efforts to create more realistic models of human decision-
making by adding a category of apparently irrational emotions
to supposedly more rational cognition have been joined by
other objections. Volz and Gigerenzer (2014) have argued that
lack of conceptual precision has rendered dual-systems models,
behavioral approaches, and neuroeconomics hard to falsify.
Moreover, scholars have criticized the psychological experiments
that have purportedly shown the existence of biases and errors
in human decision-making (Jussim, 2012). For example, Stein
(2013) has argued that the choices made in these experiments
can easily be interpreted as rational rather than fallacious. This
can be done by judging them against the standard of Baconian
(as opposed to Bayesian) probability.
Post-structuralism
Another influential camp in the social sciences during the last
40 years has been post-structuralism. During this period, post-
structuralism has become the hegemonic perspective in social
anthropology, has dominated subfields of sociology (such as
the study of science, technology, and society), and has become
quite influential as well in political science. It first emerged in
French anthropology and philosophy in the 1960s and 1970s
(Foucault, 1970; Derrida, 1976; Barthes, 1982; Deleuze, 1995),
where it attempted to provide the ongoing student revolts with
a theoretical footing. Soon, it spread to other parts of the world
(e.g., Rorty, 1979; Spivak, 1988; Žižek, 1989).
Post-structuralism posits that generalizations about social and
political life are not possible—at least not without overlooking
vital parts of empirical reality or promising avenues for social
change. True to form, many post-structuralists also resist
generalizations of their own writings, and sometimes reject the
label itself. Nevertheless, many people agree that a substantive
number of publications in the social sciences contain the
following features and can be usefully grouped under the banner
of post-structuralism (Belsey, 2002). According to the approach,
human social and emotional life is highly malleable. That is
to say, post-structuralism denies the existence of constraints
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on how people can organize, perceive, justify, and emotionally
experience their social relations. This conclusion follows from the
post-structuralist take on language. Post-structuralism holds that
language intervenes between individuals on the one hand, and
external reality on the other. Humans cannot perceive anything
but through language. It shapes the very categories with which
we think, and thus creates social reality. Moreover, language
is built from arbitrary collective constructions (often in the
form of binary opposites—such as man/woman, North/South,
white/black, emotional/rational). It is possible to think about
these collective constructs, but we can only do so with the help
of language. Hence, we are then still relying on the assumptions
and differences buried deep within language. It is therefore not
possible to escape the web of language; we are forever trapped in
it, and do not have direct access to outside reality. This inability
to achieve objectivity means that it is not possible to generate
universally valid theories of social and emotional life. Moreover,
the primacy and arbitrariness of language and discourse ensure
that people’s social and emotional lives are highly fluid. In the
words of Tamboukou (2003), Foucault and Deleuze “would both
refuse to produce a generic theory about emotions, since they
refuse any universal or primordial notion of the human essence
as such. . . . [A]ffects follow ‘lines of flight,’ escaping planes of
consistency and following unpredictable directions.” All that is
therefore left for social analysis is to reveal the power positions
privileged by, and the arbitrariness and contradictions within,
existing discourses.
Post-structuralists were quick off the mark in claiming that
neuroscience validates their approach (Connolly, 2002; Turner,
2002). They have argued that because a person’s brain displays
plasticity, is wired in unique ways, and makes use of non-
rational and non-conscious emotions, human social life must
be highly malleable. But this conclusion is arrived at by a
leap across logical gaps. It is empirically valid to state that
the human brain exhibits changes in the connective strength
between neurons, is shaped by social and cultural relations,
and that no two brains are the same. However, such changes
and differences are by no means boundless. Not only is the
general architecture of the human brain remarkably similar
across individuals (Dehaene, 2009), but the “what, where, when,
why, and how” of neuronal plasticity must be understood
as operating within strict limits. Our current understanding
of neuronal plasticity may only be rudimentary, but it is
clear that the plastic capabilities of the brain are necessarily
constrained to preserve core, overall functionalities (Gazzaniga,
2008). Second, in positing that emotions have an independent
influence on social interactions and decision-making apart from
reasoning (Ross, 2006; Gregg and Seigworth, 2010; Braunmühl,
2012), post-structuralists—like behavioral economists—overlook
the abundant empirical evidence showing that emotions and
cognition are highly intertwined. Last, by insisting that social
and emotional life is plastic, post-structuralists ignore the major
roles that subcortical nuclei play in the formation of emotions,
feelings, and decisions. In particular, the amygdala performs a
central part in decision-making by matching different emotions
to types of social situations (LeDoux, 2000). The crucial roles
that subcortical parts fulfill in human decision-making imply that
the social and emotional life of humans (and other animals) is
subject to severe constraints. In sum, current affective and social
neuroscience does not accord with post-structuralist premises
about emotions, language, and social life (Frith, 2007b).
Plural Rationality Theory
A final camp in the social sciences that we discuss consists of
plural rationality theory. This approach was first developed by
anthropologist Douglas (1970, 1978, 1982), and then extended
to economics (Douglas and Isherwood, 1996), political science
(Hood, 1998; Wildavsky, 2005; Swedlow, 2014), and sociology
(Thompson et al., 1990; Rayner, 1992; Thompson, 2008). In
earlier applications, the approach was usually called “cultural
theory,” but to avoid confusion with post-structuralist cultural
analyses, the term “plural rationality theory” is often preferred
nowadays.
This framework states that any social domain consists of
dynamic combinations and reinventions of four ways of life,
namely hierarchy, egalitarianism, individualism, and fatalism.
Each way of life comprises a particular pattern of organizing
social relations, and a corresponding cultural bias. The latter
includes perceptions, beliefs, and emotions (Perri 6, 2002).
According to the theory, these patterns of social relations and
cultural biases are mutually supportive: engaging in a certain
pattern of social interaction induces people to adopt a particular
cultural bias and, vice versa, adopting a cultural bias encourages
people to interact in a certain manner. As each way of life is
different from, but also co-dependent on, the other ways of
life, any social domain contains traces of all four patterns of
social relations and their corresponding cognitive and emotional
biases. In plural rationality theory, these four ways of life
result from assigning “high” and “low” values to two underlying
social dimensions, namely grid (or stratification; the extent to
which social roles are ranked and differentiated) and group (or
collectivity; the extent to which people feel part of a larger
social whole beyond the individual). Four alternative ways of
organizing, perceiving, and experiencing thus emerge: hierarchy
(high grid, high group); egalitarianism (low grid, high group);
individualism (low grid, low group); and fatalism (high grid, low
group). Although people’s emotions and cognition are assumed
to be influenced by the social relations in which they engage,
they retain agency and rationality. Individuals compare the truth-
claims (about nature, human nature, time, space, etc.) of their
cultural biases with their perceptions of reality. If the discrepancy
between their expectations and perceptions becomes too vast,
people will eventually opt for another way of life. People’s choices
for particular ways of life are therefore based on the accumulation
of experiences, i.e., on learning. Moreover, the theory recognizes
that an individual can adhere to alternative ways of life in
different social contexts.
Plural rationality theory appears compatible with the insights
into decision-making and behavior provided by affective and
social neuroscience (Turner and Whitehead, 2008). To start,
the theory assumes that humans are inherently social. Not just
in the shallow sense that individuals tend to engage in many
social relations, but also in the deeper meaning that people’s
cognition and emotions are influenced by the social structures
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in which they live. In addition, plural rationality theory does
not separate cognition, emotion and social relations. Each of its
ways of life includes perceptions (of human nature, risk, time,
space, justice, etc.), cognition (such as information-processing
styles), emotional likes and dislikes, as well as a pattern of social
relations (Douglas and Ney, 1998). Furthermore, in accordance
with neuroscience, the theory assumes that people’s preferences
for patterns of social relations enable their other, ostensibly non-
social choices. As Douglas (1996) puts it, “When we choose a
doctor, or a wallpaper design, or china and cutlery for the table,
and especially when we eat and when we decide not to eat meat,
the choice is part of a pattern of choices that we are making with
friends.”
Plural rationality theory also recognizes that human behavior
and decision-making are constrained. It acknowledges that social
and cultural life is highly diverse across time and space. Yet
it states that this diversity is at least partially the outcome of
the waxing and waning, as well as merging and splitting, of
just four ways of organizing, perceiving, and experiencing social
relations in every social domain. This combinatorial principle
makes sense in light of the constraints on human emotion,
cognition, and decision-making that are the consequence of the
central roles played in the brain by subcortical nuclei. Indeed,
this principle has frequently been proposed in neuroscience
(Jackendoff, 2007; Cacioppo and Patrick, 2008; Changeux, 2008).
As Dehaene (2009) puts it, “the human capacity for invention is
not endless but is narrowed by our limited neuronal construction
set. If human cultures present an appearance of teeming diversity,
it is because an exponential number of cultural forms can arise
from the multiple combinations of a restricted selection of
fundamental cultural traits.” As the evolution of the human brain
has involved the embedding of older brain regions (such as the
amygdala and hypothalamus) into new neural networks so as to
generate novel functions and richer interactions with physical
and social environments, limits must exist on the number of ways
in which people can organize, perceive, and experience social
relations (Anderson, 2015). The existence of such limits is plural
rationality theory’s core assumption.
Moreover, the constraints that are highlighted by the approach
are rooted in two social dimensions that have been found,
within social neuroscience and social psychology, to significantly
impact attention, perception, evaluation, memory, and emotion
(Cikara and Van Bavel, 2014). Douglas’ grid-notion corresponds
closely to what in these other fields has been conceptualized
as social dominance (e.g., Beasley et al., 2012). Her group-
concept resembles the manner in which social identification
has usually been operationalized, namely as the distinction
between interdependence (or collectivism) and independence (or
individualism) (Markus and Kitayama, 1991; Han and Northoff,
2008). Finally, in plural rationality theory, people’s emotional
and cognitive preferences for particular ways of organizing are
the outcomes of accumulated experiences with interactions in
social and physical environments. As a consequence, they tend to
change only after major surprises. In other words, the approach
posits that people’s emotional and cognitive biases are sticky, and
will often only change after an encounter, or set of encounters,
that defies established assumptions and expectations. This is
in line with current insights in brain research (Bechara and
Damasio, 2005). If a person’s emotions in a particular social
situation reflect, and sum up, his or her experiences in similar,
previous situations, then these emotions can be expected to
significantly shift only after the occurrence of an important,
unexpected event within that type of social situation.
In conclusion, insights developed in affective and social
neuroscience appear to be inconsistent with key premises of
rational choice analysis, behavioral economics, and public policy,
as well as post-structuralism, while they appear to be in line
with the assumptions of plural rationality theory. We are not
suggesting that the latter is the only social theory that may be
consistent with affective and social neuroscience. Others may
include the relational models theory developed by Fiske (Fiske,
1991; Jackendoff, 2007), and the heuristics program established
by Gigerenzer and colleagues (Volz et al., 2006; Hertwig et al.,
2013). It stands to reason to focusmore on such approaches when
merging the social sciences with brain research.
How Social Theory Can Improve Affective
and Social Neuroscience
In the introduction, we listed several contributions that the social
sciences can—and should—make to the further development of
brain research. These include the provision of: (1) theoretically
rigorous, and empirically endorsed, formulations of the types of
human behavior and concerns that neuroscience has begun to
investigate (such as trust, justice or beauty); and (2) suggestions
as to which neuronal networks may be involved in the brain
processing of certain types of social behaviors. In addition, the
social sciences can help neuroscientists in becoming more aware
of the cultural and political biases that they may implicitly
display in their work. In recent years, neuroscientists have started
to engage with such controversial topics as crime prevention
(Aharoni et al., 2013), the pros and cons of technology (Levitin,
2014), and conflict resolution (Bruneau et al., 2012). In doing
so, neuroscientists will have to grapple with the influence that
their own social and political biases can have on their research.
In setting out which ideological biases are likely to emerge, and
in calling attention to the influence of these biases on academic
research, the social sciences can provide partial relief (Whitehead,
2012).
It stands to reason to expect that the chances of enriching
neuroscience with social theories are increased, when these
efforts involve social science approaches consistent with the
insights that have accumulated in neuroscience during the last
decades. In the remainder of this paper, we focus on the second
contribution that social theory has to offer brain research—
serving as a source of inspiration for neuroscientific models.
We do not do so by describing, in generic terms, what this
contributionmay entail. Instead, we believe that it is more helpful
to demonstrate, with the help of a concrete example, how a
particular social theory can be used to improve a prominent,
though not undisputed, neuroscientific hypothesis. In this case,
we concentrate on the somatic marker hypothesis, and show
how it can be complemented by plural rationality theory. After
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describing the hypothesis itself, we discuss various conceptual
and empirical criticisms it has received.We then argue that plural
rationality theory can be used to specify the proposed somatic
marker mechanism so as to meet some of these criticisms.
The Somatic Marker Hypothesis
The somatic marker hypothesis (Damasio, 1994, 1999, 2003)
is currently one of the most widely discussed models of
human decision-making in affective and social neuroscience. It
incorporates, but also goes beyond, the key insights from these
fields that we presented earlier. According to this hypothesis,
somatic (i.e., bodily) states play a central role in decision-
making processes. Becoming associated with a particular type
of situation, they limit the scope of possible decisions that an
individual takes into consideration, and bias the person toward
choices that reflect previous responses made in similar situations.
In reflecting accumulated experience, somatic markers provide a
powerful, initial step in any decision-making process, bypassing
the need to laboriously re-appraise all past responses to situations
of a similar type and assessing all possible alternatives.
Let us consider this process in more detail (Damasio,
1996; Damasio and Carvalho, 2013). Throughout life, we build
associations between categories of objects and events in the world
on the one hand, and emotions and feelings on the other. In
this view, emotions consist of bodily states that are triggered in
response to “emotionally competent stimuli,” and the neuronal
mapping of these states. Alterations in bodily state may include
changes in the internal chemical milieu and visceral structures
(such as heart rate, endocrine release, and smooth muscle
contraction), as well as changes in the musculoskeletal system
associated with approach or withdrawal behaviors. Central
representations of body state are constantly updated through the
brainstem and cortical nuclei, and somatosensing areas in the
cortex such as the insula, SI, and SII. Mapped by the brain, these
bodily changes may give rise to conscious sensation, perceived
as feelings. Damasio and colleagues have proposed that the
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) plays a pivotal role
in coupling categories of events with their associated somatic
markers, and the feelings that have arisen from them in the past.
Whether acting unconsciously or consciously, somatic markers
can bias decision-making in response to emotionally competent
stimuli. With the help of neurotransmitter systems in the brain
stem (including dopamine and serotonin), the activity of neurons
subserving behavior and cognition within the cortex can be
influenced.
There are two mechanisms by which somatic states can act.
When a person is confronted with a particular event or object
(a “primary inducer”), there is initially a process of appraisal
and categorization. This can occur consciously, utilizing early
sensory and higher-order association cortices, or subconsciously,
via an evolutionarily older, subcortical route involving the
thalamus. Once the primary inducer has been associated with a
particular pleasurable or aversive emotional state, the amygdala
will trigger bodily (somatic) changes characteristic of that state.
These changes are evoked via a variety of brain structures that
include sectors of the basal ganglia and basal forebrain, midbrain
structures such as the ventral tegmental area, hypothalamus,
and brainstem nuclei, including the periacqueductal gray. The
resulting somatic states are then relayed back to the brain, where
neuronal maps representing the state of the body are formed.
Brain structures critical for this process include a variety of
brainstem nuclei, and somatosensing areas in the cortex such
as the insula, SI, and SII. When the mapping of these somatic
changes is strong enough to reach consciousness, as is often the
case, then feelings result as well. Finally, the mapping of evoked
somatic states can bias activity in the dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex, which plays a crucial role in reasoning and decision-
making before an action or response is performed.
Of course, decision-making does not always involve direct
experience of an actual event or object. Many decisions are made
based on remembering or imagining a primary inducer. Damasio
and colleagues propose that such “secondary inducers” can
operate in two ways through the VMPFC. In the first, the somatic
states characteristic of the corresponding primary inducer are
triggered within the body—the “body loop” as described earlier—
albeit in a weaker form. In the second—labeled the “as-if body
loop”—the body is bypassed, and the amygdala acts directly
in concert with those “mapping” brain structures in order to
simulate a body state, as if they were being enacted in the body
itself. In both mechanisms, the brain mapping of somatic states
that would normally correspond to the presence of a primary
inducer allows the probable bodily consequences of possible
future action to be tested in advance. In this way, the brain-based
image of body states can contribute to the planning of future
behaviors.
In any given situation, many evaluative processes may be
active. It is therefore hypothesized that a “winner takes all”
process determines which overall somatic state results. Whether
body states are triggered through the appraisal of primary
or secondary inducers, the feedback signals generated by the
body modulate activity in those brain structures supporting the
initiation of somatic states in the first place. By modulating the
threshold above which the neural components of the somatic
marker mechanism become active, the induction of subsequent
somatic states in a given situation can be facilitated or hindered.
Thus far, the somatic marker hypothesis has been
supported by evidence from studies using lesion, experimental,
neuroimaging, and psychopharmacological data (Reimann and
Bechara, 2010; Cui et al., 2013). Nevertheless, the model has
not escaped controversy. Three sets of criticisms have been
leveled. First, the experimental data supporting the hypothesis
have been challenged (Maia and McClelland, 2004; Dunn et al.,
2006; Steingroever et al., 2013). This type of data has been
collected with the help of the Iowa Gambling Task, a game
in which players have to select cards from several decks, and
in the process develop an emotional preference for the most
advantageous deck. The empirical evidence thus gathered has
been challenged on the grounds that: participants may be able
to cognitively (rather than emotionally) determine which deck
offers the highest earnings; it is unclear whether emotions
follow or precede choices; the data from these experiments
may also support alternative explanations; and significant
variation exists among the strategies of healthy participants.
In response, it has been asserted that none of these challenges
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are truly fatal to the somatic marker hypothesis, and that the
hypothesis has also been supported by other types of data
(Bechara et al., 2005; Guillaume et al., 2009; Turnbull et al.,
2014). Moreover, these criticisms appear to assume that somatic
markers are necessarily unconscious and/or replace reasoning.
Yet, according to Damasio’s hypothesis, somatic markers can
be conscious as well as unconscious, and support (rather than
replace) reasoning. A second critique states that the somatic
marker model is not incorrect, but is incomplete. The model
illuminates how body representations in the brain are central
components of people’s emotions and feelings toward objects
and events. But it does not address why an individual experiences
certain body representations (and emotions and feelings) rather
than others when confronted with a particular object or event
(Craig, 2002; Panksepp, 2003). As such, the model needs to be
complemented. Both critiques boil down to a third claim, namely
that it is important to further develop and specify the somatic
marker hypothesis so as to allow additional testing (Ohira, 2010;
Bartol and Linquist, 2015). It has for instance been suggested
that alternative somatic markers may be at work for different
types of decisions and situations (Bechara et al., 2005). Plural
rationality theory can be of assistance in thus developing the
model. The approach applies in particular to decision-making
in highly complex and uncertain—so-called “ill-structured”
(Simon, 1973)—social situations (Wildavsky, 1987). It can be
used to further specify how the somatic marker mechanism
works in this type of social situations.
Using Plural Rationality Theory to Complement
the Somatic Marker Hypothesis
Plural rationality theory posits that a person evaluates a complex
social situation by automatically (and often subconsciously)
noting: (1) the amount of stratification and collectivity present
within that situation; and then (2) comparing these scores to his
or her preferred levels of stratification and collectivity for that
type of situation (as based on previous experiences within that
type of situation). If both these scores match, then a person will
be favorably predisposed toward that situation. If not, then the
person will tend to feel negatively about the situation.
This makes sense from a neuroscientific perspective. From
that vantage point, we can ask: what are the characteristics that
available features of social situations should exhibit in order
to be useful in the evaluation of those social situations? First,
in order to serve their role in the somatic marker mechanism,
these elements would have to be present in each and every social
situation. Second, this also means that people would have to able
to easily and quickly display the types of social behavior that
constitute these elements. Third, these aspects of social situations
should be instantly recognizable for people, even at a young
age. Fourth, people would be automatically and continuously
scanning their social environments for these elements. Last, given
the proposal that the emotional apparatus involved has early
evolutionary origins, the types of behavior that make up these
elements of social situations should be recognizable within other
species as well, and in particular among those sitting closest to us
on our evolutionary branch.
Grid (or stratification) and group (or collectivity) fulfill all
these criteria. They are universal aspects of social situations.
When people interact, they will behave according to perceived
ranking differences and the degree to which they feel others are
caring (Todorov et al., 2008). Indeed, these types of behavior
may have a hormonal basis. It has been hypothesized that
oxytocin promotes social approach behavior (high group), while
arginine-vasopressin induces social withdrawal (low group)
(Harari-Dahan and Bernstein, 2014). Moreover, there is some
evidence that testosterone enables social dominance (grid)
(van Honk et al., 2014). In addition, it has been argued that
levels of stratification and collectivity are quickly perceived
by the human brain due to the embodied nature of these
forms of interacting (Fiske et al., 2009). Stratification and
collectivity are typically accompanied by, associated with, and
therefore easily re-presented through, certain bodily postures.
Stratification is closely linked to vertical differences in body
posture: those in charge are often placed higher up and look
down on others, are bowed to, stretch their arms in victory,
etc (Schubert, 2005). Collectivity is often experienced through
physical closeness, such as shaking hands, standing shoulder
to shoulder, embracing one another, grooming, and so on
(Schubert et al., 2008). In a series of experiments, Thomsen
and colleagues (Thomsen et al., 2011) have shown that 10–13
months old infants already rely on the relative size of agents
to predict the outcome of dominance contests among them.
This work has been interpreted as suggesting that, from a very
early age, whenever a person observes a social situation, he
or she first and foremost notices those physical features (for
instance related to movement or posture) that are themselves
directly embodied in the observer, i.e., that can trigger changes
in the observer’s body state1. Furthermore, when the human
brain is in its “default state” (i.e., not engaged actively in a
task), the social environment is still being scanned for human
interactions in general, and stratification and collectivity in
particular (Iacoboni et al., 2004). Last, both grid and group
appear omnipresent in the social relations of other animals
as well (Chiao, 2010; Swedell, 2012). In particular, de Waal’s
studies of chimpanzees and bonobos—the animal species with
the most similar genetic make-up as humans—reveal patterns
of interaction that come close to those distinguished in human
behavior by Douglas (de Waal and Lanting, 1998; de Waal,
2007).
Different levels of stratification and collectivity are therefore
excellent candidates for core categories with which humans
evaluate social situations. Indeed, as we noted above, these
have already attracted ample attention in brain research
and social psychology. Plural rationality theory provides a
comprehensive framework of human decision-making in
complex social situations that is based on this hypothesis.
Moreover, an abundance of empirical evidence in favor of plural
1These processes of embodied cognition can be expected to involve mirror
neurons, as these cells are active both when undertaking and observing a particular
action (Gallese, 2005). Interestingly, Damasio and collaborators have argued that
mirror neuron networks constitute part of the as-if body loop of the somatic
marker mechanism (Damasio andMeyer, 2008; Immordino-Yang, 2008; Damasio,
2010).
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rationality theory has been collected in social anthropology,
sociology, and political science (Douglas, 1982; Verweij
and Thompson, 2006; Olli, 2012). Plural rationality theory
can therefore complement, and further specify, the somatic
marker mechanism. Doing so results in the following testable
model.
As described by the somatic marker hypothesis, whenever a
person observes a social situation (or an opinion stated about
such a situation), then brain processes related to the integration,
abstraction and categorization of this scene will take place in the
relevant sensory and association cortices.We propose that during
this phase, the brain will be particularly attentive to the levels
of grid and group that appear present in the social situation,
or that appear to be promoted (or discouraged) by the opinion
stated. This information about the levels of grid and group will
then be passed on to either the amygdala (in case of direct
experiences) or the VMPFC (in case of imagined or remembered
social situations), through which their associated, characteristic
somatic states will be either induced or simulated, respectively.
We propose as well that when the initial process of categorization
is completed, and a social situation (or an opinion thereof)
has been recognized as belonging (or referring) to a particular
category of situations, then this should also lead to the recall of
the levels of stratification and collectivity preferred for this type
of situation by the person in question. A comparison between
actual and preferred levels of stratification and collectivity will
take place, altering subsequent behavior in response to the social
situation being experienced2.
Thus, plural rationality theory can be used to elaborate how
the somatic marker mechanism may function in highly complex
social situations. The call for such testable specifications has
often been heard among the criticisms leveled at the somatic
marker hypothesis. Complementing the hypothesis with the help
of Douglas’ plural rationality theory therefore illustrates how
social science approaches can sometimes serve to strengthen
neuroscientific concepts and models.
Clearing up a Conceptual Conundrum
Confounding Plural Rationality Theory
If empirically valid, then our proposal might even resolve a
conundrum that has long worried plural rationality theorists
(Thompson, 1982). Douglas (1978) derived four alternative ways
of organizing (and supporting ways of viewing and experiencing
nature, human nature, time, space, risk, etc.) by assigning high
and low values to two underlying social dimensions. That is
to say, grid and group are treated as dichotomous. However,
they appear to be defined as continuous dimensions (namely,
as variable levels of stratification and collectivity). Our model
shows a way out of this conundrum. The strength of Douglas’
proposal is the way in which a huge diversity in the organization
and perception of social relations can arise through two simple,
readily available, and highly informative features: grid and
group. Both the categorization of complex social relations in
terms of these two features, and the intimate relationship
between these features and body states, earmark them as highly
2For simplicity’s sake, we are leaving out the formation of conscious beliefs.
suitable candidates for the operation of the somatic marker
mechanism, at least in highly complex social situations. Given
that neuronal networks routinely function with the help of a
threshold mechanism, it is plausible to expect that the grid and
group dimensions, as part of the somatic markermechanism, also
operate on the basis of a threshold. If the threshold is met, then
high grid or group is detected. If not, then low grid or group is
detected. Moreover, once high or low levels of grid and group
have been detected in a specific social situation, then (according
to our proposal) these will be compared to preferred degrees of
stratification and collectivity for that type of situation. Depending
on the outcome of this comparison, the somatosensory
pattern postulated by the somatic marker mechanism marks
the specific situation as either pleasant or unpleasant, i.e.,
either appetitive or aversive emotions and feelings result.
This would turn continuous variables into dichotomous
ones, and thus justify the high/low distinction proposed by
Douglas.
Although a division of grid and group into high or low—
giving rise to the four categories of social life—might appear
limited, for various reasons this framework is able to generate
wide flexibility and diversity in the assessment of social relations.
First, the classification of a given social scenario is not an all-or-
nothing, one-off event. It arises over time in response to many
factors indicative of social relations such as tone of voice, body
language, visual appearance, etc. In line with plural rationality
theory (Gross and Rayner, 1985; Olli, 2012), we suggest that the
classification of social relations will occur at many points over
the course of this emerging dynamic, resulting in a continually
updated and re-calculated “average” classification. Each social
scenario can differ in both the extent to which the four ways
of organizing are represented, and the number of momentary
classifications falling into each category. Therefore, rather than
introducing an additional continuous variable into our model
that represents the intensity of hierarchal, egalitarian, fatalist
and individualist categories—or for that matter replacing the
high/low division within grid and group itself with a continuous
variable—a measure for their intensity emerges automatically
over the course of real-life interactions. The more classifications
that fall into one of the four categories of social relations, the
more that category biases the overall classification and experience
of the social scenario. This approach seems conceptually well
suited to the simplicity of the somatic marker mechanism.
Second, we propose that the threshold between high and low
calculations for grid and group would itself be subject to
modulation, thus introducing subject-specific variation in the
classification of features and events into the four categories
of social relations. If, for example, the grid threshold were to
decrease for a given subject, then many more features and
events would be defined as being “high” grid (i.e., being above
threshold), biasing overall classifications in the hierarchical and
fatalist categories. These two components of the classification
process (the threshold at which a classification occurs, and
its calculated intensity), coupled with a flexibility in their
triggering of body states, result in a system for the processing
of social relations that has a great subtlety, nuance, and
individuality.
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Plural Rationality Theory and Neuroimaging:
Experimental Avenues
It will be useful to map, experimentally, the neuronal networks
that support the detection, comparison, and evaluation of
stratification and collectivity in social situations.We are planning
two functional neuroimaging experiments that simultaneously
investigate all four elementary forms of social relations
distinguished in plural rationality theory. The first of these
will expose participants to previously recorded visual media
scenes depicting social interactions that can be characterized as
individualistic, hierarchical, egalitarian, or fatalistic. Participants,
numbering around 20, will be drawn from students previously
trained and tested in recognizing plural rationality theory’s
categories. In the scanner, they will be asked to indicate
for each scene whether the interaction can be categorized as
individualistic, hierarchical, egalitarian, or fatalistic. Multivariate
pattern analysis of brain activity for hierarchical (high grid/high
group) and fatalistic (high grid/low group) scenes should
then reveal brain responses that mediate high grid. Analysis
of individualistic (low grid/low group) and egalitarian (low
grid/high group) situations should uncover brain responses that
mediate low grid. In this way, the neuronal correlates of high
group (comparing egalitarian and hierarchical scenes) and low
group (comparing individualistic and fatalistic situations) could
also be revealed. A simple control condition would involve
the observation and, later, classification of simple, performed
motor tasks. In controlling for both sensory (visual and auditory)
processing, as well as rudimentary decision making processes
related to the classification of previously observed situations,
contrasts between control and test conditions would reveal the
machinery that underlies the processing and categorization of
social relations in particular.
This first study investigates the conscious reflection on, and
identification of, the four types of social relations arising in
scenarios in which the subject plays no role. It will be useful to
compare its results with those of a second study that concentrates
on decision-making by participants while they are actively
immersed in more “natural” social situations, in which the
classification of social relations arises automatically, and does not
follow from a conscious decision to do so. This second design will
make use of priming techniques. One of the techniques available
is the construction of alternative virtual social realities in which
participants interact with anthropomorphic avatars (Przyrembel
et al., 2012). We will build individualistic, egalitarian, fatalistic,
and hierarchical virtual social realities. Participation in these
virtual reality scenarios will prime subjects to think, feel, and act
according to a certain set of social relations. After this priming
component, participants will be confronted in the scanner
with an image of one of the avatars, and tasked with making
predictions (from a number of possible options) concerning
the behavior of that avatar in a variety of social situations. By
asking participants to engage with different virtual social realities,
within-subject comparisons will become possible. As before,
participants will number no more than 20, and multivariate
pattern classification methods will be used to identify the
neuronal correlates of grid and group. A control condition would
again consist of observing and naming simple motor task.
These are only two examples of how our proposal for an
extended somatic marker mechanism can be put to the test3.
Other designs are surely possible, and need to be developed.
Only a combination of designs, each with their own particular
experimental strengths, will be able to shed light on the empirical
validity of our model.
Conclusion
We have argued that affective and social neuroscience need
social theory, and vice versa. We have also shown how these
processes of mutual support can be organized. The insights into
cognition, emotion, decision-making, and social behavior that
have been carefully built up and tested in neuroscience over the
last few decades could provide an additional assessment of social
theories. It would be less than ideal if such theories rested on
assumptions and hypotheses about human cognition, emotion,
and behavior that were incompatible with these insights. Yet, this
appears to be the case for three leading approaches in the social
sciences, namely rational choice theory, behavioral economics,
and public policy, and post-structuralism. In contrast, Douglas’
plural rationality theory is consistent with present-day affective
and social neuroscience. As a consequence, this approach and
similar ones (such as Fiske’s relational models theory) may be
of great use to the further development of neuroscience. They
can offer conceptually sophisticated, and empirically supported,
definitions of the social phenomena that neuroscience has
become interested in exploring. They allow neuroscientists
wading into public debates an opportunity to becomemore aware
of the ideological assumptions lurking behind their research.
Last, such theories can lead to suggestions as to the content
of the models with which neuroscientists seek to explain how
the human brain processes and evaluates social and political
phenomena. In this article, we have for example shown how
Douglas’ plural rationality theory can be used to propose a more
comprehensive and specific version of Damasio’s somatic marker
hypothesis. Achieving all this will not be easy, as it will require
a mutually respectful interaction between different academic
cultures. But it can be done, or so we feel.
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